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 A B S T R A C T  
The inconsistency of the results in previous studies related to the relationship of firm
size and leverage on earnings management practices is still interesting. In contrast to
the previous studies, this study is not merely  to determine the effect of firm size, lev-
erage, and corporate governance on earnings management practices partially but also
to include the variable corporate governance (CG) is also thought to be able to moder-
ate the effect of firm size and leverage variables on earnings management practices. 
Discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings management and are also measured
using Performance-Matched Discretionary Accruals Model. Using Moderated Re-
gression Analysis (MRA) and Residual Test, the result shows that firm size and cor-
porate governance have a significant effect on earnings management, whereas the
leverage was not found to have a significant effect. In addition, the results of this
study indicate that corporate governance is able to moderate the relationship firm size 
and leverage on earnings management practices.  
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 A B S T R A K  
Ketidakkonsistenan hasil dalam studi sebelumnya yang berkaitan dengan hubungan 
ukuran perusahaan dan leverage pada praktik manajemen laba masih menarik. Ber-
beda dengan studi sebelumnya, studi ini tidak hanya untuk mengetahui pengaruh 
ukuran perusahaan, leverage, dan tata kelola perusahaan pada praktik manajemen laba 
secara parsial, tetapi juga memasukkan variabel corporate governance (CG) yang 
dianggap mampu memoderasi pengaruh variabel ukuran perusahaan dan leverage 
pada praktik manajemen laba. Akrual diskresioner sebagai proksi untuk manajemen
laba diukur dengan Performance-Matched Discretionary Accruals Model. Meng-
gunakan Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) dan Uji Residual, hasilnya menun-
jukkan bahwa ukuran perusahaan dan corporate governance berpengaruh signifikan
pada manajemen laba, sedangkan leverage tidak berpengaruh signifikan. Selain itu, 
hasil studi ini menunjukkan bahwa corporate governance mampu memoderasi hubun-
gan ukuran perusahaan dan leverage pada praktik manajemen laba.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The practice of earnings management implemented 
by management has various purposes. One of them 
is an opportunistic behavior that can maximize its 
own utility by using judgment to accelerate or de-
accelerate revenue recognition and expense. This 
kind of measure will directly affect the profit infor-
mation presented in a financial report. As stated by 
Wirama (2002), earnings management that is done 
repeatedly by management in the long-time impacts 
companies because financial report released by 
companies does not fully represent the companies’ 
actual condition.  
Realizing the importance of the public and stake 
holder’s trust in supporting the survival of a com-
pany, regulators in Indonesia such as Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan (Financial Service Authority) and Bursa 
Efek Indonesia (Indonesia Stock Exchange) have tried 
to protect the activities of corporations from the 
management’s opportunistic behavior by imple-
menting the concept of good corporate governance 
(GCG). Cornett et al. (2006) along with Gulzar & 
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Zongjun (2011); Murhadi (2009); Chung and Hsiang 
(2007) in their research, discovered the negative im-
pact of corporate governance mechanism on discre-
tionary accruals as a measurement of earnings man-
agement. The implementation of CG concept is ex-
pected to raise oversight and transparency in a com-
pany, so that CG acts as a factor, which influences 
the behavior of management regarding the conduct 
of earnings management as mentioned by Watts 
(2003) which stated the implementation of corporate 
governance (CG) as one of the ways to monitor con-
tract issues and reduce the management’s opportun-
istic behavior.  
This research tries to figure out the effect of 
company size, leverage and corporate governance 
implementation on earnings management. Even 
though previous research on the impact of company 
size on earnings management has been widely stud-
ied, many of its finding are on the contrary, such as 
the study of Alviantini (2013), Nassirzadeh et al. 
(2012), Kouki et al. (2011), Halim et al. (2006) and 
Kim et al. (2003) which discovered that the firm size 
have positive impact on earnings management. 
However, on the contrary, other research such as 
Swastika (2013), Tangjitprom (2013), Rezaei and 
Roshani (2012), and Wuryani (2012) discovered a 
negative relation between the firm size and earnings 
management.  
Previous studies on the influence of leverage on 
earnings management also produced contrary re-
sults, such as the research of Shiri et al. (2012), 
Roodposhti and Chashmi (2011), and Bekiris and 
Doukakis (2011) which revealed that leverage has 
positive impacts towards earnings management, 
while a study by Nejad et al. (2012), and Wasimullah 
(2010) found negative results between leverage and 
earnings management.  
In contrast to previous research (Alviantini 2013); 
Nazzizadeh et al. 2012; Nejad et al. 2012; Bekiris and 
Doukakis 2011; Gulzar and Zongjun 2011; Kouki et al. 
2011; Wasimullah 2010; Murhadi 2009; Chung and 
Hsiang 2007; Halim 2006), this research is not only to 
examine the influence of firm size, leverage or CG on 
the practice of earnings management partially. This 
research will also examine the effect of CG as a mod-
erating influence of firm size and leverage on earnings 
management. The implementation of CG in a com-
pany functions as a supervising factor on the entire 
course of a company’s activities that can pressure 
various acts of opportunistic behavior in a company, 
hence a good implementation of CG can strengthen or 
weaken the effect of firm size and leverage towards 
the conduct of earnings management. Hence, the ad-
dition purpose of this research is figure out the influ-
ence of CG towards the relation of firm size and lev-
erage towards earnings management.  
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESIS  
Earnings management is a phenomenon, which can-
not be avoided due to the management’s discretion 
in the use of accrual basis when preparing financial 
statements. This accrual principle is agreed upon as 
a basis for financial statements preparation due to 
the fact that the basis of accrual is indeed more ra-
tional and fair in comparison to cash basis (Setiawati 
2002). However the discretion possessed by man-
agement can create various motivations that can 
push managers to perform earnings management. 
For instance, manager becomes motivated to report 
lower profit, one of them being to reduce political 
cost, among others to reduce workers unions de-
mand, minimize company income tax or avoid other 
government regulations that reduce company in-
come. Thus, the total accruals can be differed to two 
different parts of accrual: accruals that are naturally 
present in the process of preparing a financial state-
ment (nondiscretionary accruals) and discretionary 
accruals that includes estimation, the selection of 
accounting policies, allocation, as well as decision 
that includes management’s policy that is subjective.  
Numerous motivations can push managers to 
perform earnings management. For example, man-
agers can attain a number of reasons to lower the 
report of earnings. One of them is lowering political 
cost, an example of a reaction towards the demands 
of workers union, to avoid other government rela-
tions that can reduce company’s revenue which is 
known as political cost hypothesis or size hypothesis 
(Watts and Zimmerman (1986). The size hypothesis 
shows that the larger the company is, the larger the 
probability of the company to choose an accounting 
method that will lower earnings, with the purpose to 
reduce the political cost, in order to avoid govern-
ment actions of implementing more regulations that 
can lower the company’s revenue. This condition 
shows that firm size can motive management to 
practice earnings management. However, previous 
research is not always in line with that hypothesis. 
Alviantini (2013), Nassirzadeh et al. (2012), Kouki et 
al. (2011) and Halim et al. (2005) in their researches 
attained results that firm size impacts positively on 
earnings management. Firm size is a scale where the 
size of the companies can be classified from a num-
ber of methods or standpoints: its total assets, total 
sales, the market value of the stock and others. In 
this research the firm size is proxied by using the 
total asset logs. 
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H1: Firm size has an effect on earnings management. 
The management can also be motivated to 
choose an accounting method, which can impact on 
the increase of earnings. Companies sometimes have 
debts that contain specific covenants based on ac-
counting numbers, usually in a form of money ratio. 
Leverage ration can picture how large the operations 
of a company are being funded by debt. Companies 
with high leverage level can be motivated to perform 
earnings management so that they will be spared 
from debt covenant violation. The violation of such 
violations can have a huge impact towards the com-
pany. Therefore managers will always try to main-
tain its leverage ration in accordance to its debt re-
quirements, this includes performing earnings man-
agement. In this case, earnings will usually be re-
ported higher. This is done to maintain the com-
pany’s reputation from the external’s parties per-
spective, because companies that have high debt 
ration will find difficulties additional funds from 
creditors, as a matter of fact such companies are 
threatened in violating debt covenant, as mentioned 
in the debt covenant hypothesis (Watts and Zim-
merman, 1986). Research conducted by Shiri et al. 
(2012), Roodposhti and Chashmi (2011), and Bekiris 
and Doukakis (2011) showed that leverage influ-
ences earning management. In line with the debt 
covenant hypothesis, the high level of leverage at-
tained by a company can motivate the management 
to perform earnings management so that they can 
avoid the violation of debt covenant.  
H2: Leverage has a positive effect on earnings man-
agement 
CG concept is basically a matter of controlling 
and directing the activities of corporations, in order 
to achieve harmony between major parties such as 
are shareholders, management, board of directors 
along with stakeholders, including employees, sup-
pliers, customers, bank and other creditors, regula-
tors, environment and the general public, so that the 
corporation provides benefit as a whole (Kaen 
2003:17). 
According to the National Committee of Gov-
ernance Policy —KNKG (2006), the implementation 
of CG can be pushed from two drives: ethics and 
regulation. The ethical driven push comes from the 
awareness of businesses to practice their business in 
way that prioritize the survival of the company, 
stakeholders’ interest, and evade ways that create 
short-term gains. On the other hand, regulatory 
driven push forces companies to obey the existing 
laws and regulation.  
There are five existing CG (TARIF) which are 
formulated by the Organization for Economic Corpora-
tion and Development—OECD (2004), these five exist-
ing CGs are: (1) Transparency (includes the release 
of adequate information, accurate and timely to-
wards company’s stakeholders); (2) accountability 
(emphasizes on clear function, structure, system and 
accountability, so that company management is per-
formed effectively; (3) responsibility (demand com-
panies in performing their business activities with 
full responsibility); (4) independency (demand com-
pany managers to act independently and profes-
sionally based on their role and functions without 
any pressure from parties that are not in accordance 
to the company’s existing operating system); and (5) 
fairness (fair and equal treatment in both service and 
information in order to fulfill the rights of stake-
holder which arises based on existing agreements 
and regulations).  
The continued development of study and re-
search regarding CG has created a measurement, 
which represents the implementation level of CG by 
companies. Such measurements are scores or CG 
indexes, which is the ranking of companies based on 
the implementation of CG. In Indonesia index CG 
can be measured by Indonesian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (IICG) with its CG index known as Cor-
porate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) and Indone-
sian Institute for Corporate Directorship (IICD) with its 
Corporate Governance Scorecard (CGS). 
Murhadi (2009) in his research concludes that 
the practice of CG has a negative impact towards 
earnings management conducted by a company. 
Gulzar and Zongjun (2011) their research shows that 
the characteristics from the corporate governance 
mechanism play an important role in reducing earn-
ings management. The implementation of corporate 
governance proves in limiting the tendency of man-
agement to perform earnings management and ac-
tually directs the presentment of a financial report 
with higher credibility (Bekiris and Doukakis 2011). 
The research of Chung and Hsiang (2007) showed 
that the implementation of CG could reduce the 
earnings management behavior. Hence, CG can af-
fect earnings management directly and indirectly 
through firm size and leverage. 
Based on such description, therefore the hy-
potheses proposed in this study are: 
H3: Corporate governance has a negative effect on 
earnings management 
H4: Corporate Governance (CG) weakens the relation 
of firm size on earnings management. 
H5: Corporate Governance (CG) weakens the relation 
of leverage on earnings management.  
The relation of those variables can be explained 
by the relation of each variable on the Figure 1. 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Data and Sample Selection 
This research uses secondary data acquired from the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange by accessing the official 
website at www.idx.co.id and also by paying a visit to 
its Stock Markets Information Center located at PB. 
Sudirman Street 10X Kav 2 Denpasar-Bali, Phone 
(0361) 256-701. Data used compromises of company 
financial report samples, primarily consisting of bal-
ance, income statement, and company cash flow re-
ports for the years of 2009-2011. Other than financial 
data, this research also uses corporate governance 
index data acquired from IICD, located Jakarta Pusat 
10340, Email: info@iicd.or.id and its official website at 
www.iicd.or.id.  
The populations in this research are all compa-
nies included in the Indonesia Most Trusted Com-
panies list, based on the Indonesian Institute for 
Corporate Governance (IICG) research in coopera-
tion with SWA magazine and registered at the Indo-
nesian Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011, with a 
total of 79 companies. The selection of such compa-
nies as a population in the research is based on its 
predicate as Indonesia Most Trusted Companies, 
which is a form of appreciation especially for various 
companies that display its sincerity in implementing 
CG as a trusted company. Such appreciation is as-
sessed by independent external parties and is in 
form of acknowledgement on a company’s commit-
ment and achievement as well as an award for its 
seriousness and voluntarily willingness in the 
awareness of the importance of CG implementation. 
The procedures of sample selection are done by 
using a purposive sampling approach, with the fol-
lowing criteria: companies included in the category 
of Indonesia Most Trusted Companies of 2009-2011 
period and listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
Companies those are not in the banking and finance 
industry, due to the fact, such companies have a 
highly regulated characteristic. Companies that re-
lease complete financial reports annually that ends 
as of 31 December at the time of the observation and 
5 years before. It aims to obtain data that supports 
the calculation of enterprise value and accrual com-
ponents. Also other criteria are companies that pub-
licize annual financial reports in Indonesian Rupiah. 
Based on stated criteria a total sample of 47 compa-
nies was acquired.  
 
Measurement and Operational Definition of Vari-
ables 
Dependent Variables 
The practice of earnings management in this re-
search is measured by discretionary accrual, which is 
calculated with the performance-matched discre-
tionary accruals model. This model was developed 
by Kothari et al. (2005), in which the basic idea is that 
accruals in a growing company is systematically 
expected not to be zero, so that the performance of 
such company is related to accrual. Thus, in order to 
control the performance that is unusual in estimating 
discretionary accrual included in performance vari-
ables such as the return on assets in calculating non-
discretionary accrual (Sulistiawan et al. 2011). Below 
is a mathematical overview of a performance-
matched discretionary accruals model. 
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 (1) 
Total Accruals for period t is expressed in the fol-
lowing equation 
TAit = NIit– CFOit (2) 
Figure 1 
The Relations of the Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
  Direct effect 
  Moderating effect 
Size 
Earnings Management 
Leverage 
Corporate Governance (CG) 
H3 
H4 
H5 
H2 
H1 
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Vol. 17, No. 2, August 2014, pages 259 – 268 
263 
Description: 
TAit = total accruals of firm i at period t. 
Ait-1 = total assets of firm i in period t-1 (the begin-
ning of the year) 
ΔREVit = revenue of firm i in period t minus earn-
ings in period t-1. 
ΔRECit = receivables firm i in period t minus receiv-
ables at period t-1. 
ΔROAit = return ration on assets of firm i in period t. 
PPEit = gross tangible fixed assets of firm i at period 
t. 
εit =  discretionary accruals of firm i in period t. 
α, β1, β2, β3 = parameters obtained from the regres-
sion equation. 
NI  = Net Income 
CFO  = Cash Flow from Operation 
Non-discretionary Accruals (NDA) can be de-
termined by retracting coefficients from the results 
of regression equation (1) on the next equation. 
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Non-discretionary Accruals (NDA) of each 
company can be calculated by using the equation 
below. 
it
it
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it NDAA
TADA −=
−1
. (4) 
Description: 
DAit = discretionary accruals of firm i in period t. 
NDAit = non-discretionary accruals of firm i in pe-
riod t. 
 
Independent and Moderating Variables  
The independent variables in this research consist of 
firm size, leverage and CG. CG variables in this re-
search also act as a moderating variable. Firm size is 
a scale where the size of the companies can be classi-
fied from a number of methods or standpoints: its 
total assets, total sales, the market value of the stock 
and others. In this research the firm size is proxied 
by using the total asset logs. Total asset is chosen as 
a firm size proxy by considering that the total assets 
is relatively stable compared to the market value of 
the stocks and sales in measuring the firm size (Su-
darmadji and Sularto 2007). 
Firm size = Log (Total Asset) (5) 
Leverage is a ratio that measures the size of as-
sets that are financed by debts. This research uses the 
debt to total assets ratio calculated by using the 
equation below: 
TotalAsset
TotalDebtLeverage = . (6) 
CG (Corporate Governance) in this research is 
measured by using score or the CG index provided 
by IICD’s (Indonesian Institute for Corporate Direc-
torship) research. The CG scorecard method refers to 
the International Standard Code on GCG deter-
mined by OECD (Organization of Economic Coop-
eration and Development). The score is provided in 
terms of percentage with a 100 % maximum value. 
Utama (2010) mentioned that the Corporate Govern-
ance Scorecard being used as a CG implementation 
evaluation tool by the IICD can be categorized to a 
number of scores: excellence (95-100%), good (80-
89%), fair (60-79%) and poor (less than 60%).Each 
score has its own interpretation based on GCG prac-
tice assessment criteria determined by the IICD. CG 
Scorecard provided by IICD’s research is based on a 
variety of publicly available information, such as 
annual report and financial reports released by pub-
lic companies, meeting minutes, records of the gen-
eral meeting of shareholders, as well as other pub-
licly available information, so that the result of the 
evaluation in such scorecard can represent the level 
of CG implementation comprehensively. Such as-
sessment scores are expected to represent the im-
plantation of CG comprehensively in a company.  
 
Data Analysis Technique  
Moderated Regression Analysis 
The data analysis technique to test hypothesis 1, 2 
and 3 on how does size, leverage, and CG influences 
earnings management in this research uses moder-
ated regression analysis (MRA). But, the CG variable 
test as a moderating variable for the relation of size 
and leverage on earnings management with this 
MRA technique has a likelihood of high multicollin-
earity among independent variables and this can 
violate classical assumptions. So as to test hypothesis 
5 and 6, namely whether the CG variables affect the 
relationship of size and leverage on earnings man-
agement is to use residual test.  
The statistical equations used are as follows 
DAit = α it + β1SIZE it + β2LEV it + β3CG it+ 
β4SIZE*CG it +β5LEV*CG it + e it. (7) 
Description:  
DA = Discretionary accruals (Earnings Management) 
α = Constants 
SIZE = Firm size 
LEV = Leverage  
CG = Corporate Governance 
SIZE*CG= Interaction between firm size and corpo-
rate governance 
LEV*CG= Interaction between leverage and corpo-
rate governance 
e = error term. 
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i = industry 
t = year. 
Regression coefficient (β) shows the magnitude 
of the changing of dependent variable when the in-
dependent variable changes one unit. The relation-
ship direction from such regression coefficient indi-
cates the relationship direction between independent 
variable and dependent variable. The acceptable 
level of error in this statistical testing is (α) 5%. 
 
Residual Test 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 will be tested with residual test. 
Residual test is used to discover whether corporate 
governance (CG) can moderate the relation between 
firm size (SIZE) and leverage (LEV) on earnings 
management (DA).  
The steps of residual examinations are as follow. 
1. Regressing between CG towards SIZE as well as 
LEV to gain residual value (e). The statistical equa-
tion, which can be used, is as follow.  
CG it = α it + β6 SIZE it + e it. (8) 
CG it = α it + β7 LEV it + e it. (9) 
2. Finding the absolute value of residuals (| e |). 
3. Regressing the absolute value of residuals gained 
from equation 8 and 9 with DA variable as its inde-
pendent variables. If the coefficient parameter value 
is negative and significant, then the CG variable is a 
moderating variable. The statistical equation used is 
as follow.  
| e | = α + β8 DA. (10) 
| e | = α + β9 DA. (11) 
Description: 
DA = Discretionary accrual 
α = Constants 
SIZE = Firm size 
LEV = Leverage  
CG = Corporate Governance 
e = lack of fit residual 
β6 - β9 = Coefficients of regression 
i = Industry 
t = Year 
The residual analysis testing the deviation ef-
fect (absolute residual value) of a particular model 
is a lack of fit resulted from the deviation of the 
linear relationship between the independent vari-
able. Lack of fit is indicated by the residual value in 
a regression (Ghozali 2011: 207). The coefficient 
value of β8 and β9 on the regression equation of (10) 
and (11) pictures whether CG variable is a moderat-
ing variable can be seen on its significant and nega-
tive results (which means the presence of lack of fit 
between firm size and CG as well as between lever-
age and CG results the decrease of DA or nega-
tively effecting. 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Based on the results of interaction tests (MRA), the 
conclusion of interaction tests (MRA) is shown at 
Table 1. 
The F test results shows that significant value at 
0.000 so that it can be concluded that the regression 
model can be used to predict the influence of firm 
size, leverage, as well as CG towards earnings man-
agement partially and can be used to discover the 
effect of CG towards the relationship of firm size and 
leverage towards earnings management. The deter-
mining coefficient (R2) = 0.481 has a meaning that 
48.1 percent of the earnings management changes 
(DA) variable is influenced by firm size, leverage 
and CG simultaneously while 51.9 percent of the rest 
is explained by other variables that is not included in 
this research model.  
A partial test performed by a t-test. This t-test is 
done to find out the effect of independent variable 
partially towards its dependent variable. The results 
of the test partially are as follow; 
The first hypothesis (H1) states that firm size 
positively affects earnings management. The pur-
pose of the test is to find out the influence of firm 
size towards earnings management. Based on the 
statistical test results are shown in Table 1, that firm 
size positively affects earnings management; this can 
be proved by seeing the positive regression coeffi-
cient value positive (0.046) as well as the smaller 
significant value of 0.003, smaller than the significant 
level of α = 0.05. Thus the H1 hypothesis value, 
which states that firm size positively, effects earn-
ings management can be accepted. In this case firm 
size can motivate management to perform earnings 
management. The larger the size of a company 
means the larger the chance for a company to earn 
profit from its business activity. The faster the ex-
pansion of a company occurs, the more complex its 
operational activities gets and most certainly the 
company will be demanded to fulfill its investors 
expectations, in this case there could be more pres-
sure to perform earnings management. So as the 
larger the company gets, there would probably be 
more motivation for larger management to perform 
earnings management. This research supports pre-
vious research of Alviantini (2013), Nassirzadeh et 
al. (2012), Kouki et al. (2011), Halim et al. (2006) and 
Kim et al. (2003) Kim et al.(2003), Halim et al. (2005), 
Koukiet al. (2011), Nassirzadeh et al. (2012), and Al-
viantini (2013), which states firm size influences 
positively on earnings management. The results of 
such statistic test provided findings in contrary with 
political cost hypothesis (size hypothesis) from Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) which shows that the larger 
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the size of the company, the larger the probability of 
such company to choose an accounting method that 
will decrease profits with the purpose to decrease 
political cost, hence avoiding government action 
which can decrease company income by implement-
ing more regulation. This research is also in contrary 
towards the research of Swastika (2013), Tangjit-
prom (2013), Rezaei and Roshani (2012), and Wury-
ani (2012) which discovers negative effects of firm 
size towards earnings management.  
The second hypothesis (H2) states that leverage 
positively affects earnings management. The pur-
pose of this test is to discover the effect of leverage 
towards earnings management. Based on the statisti-
cal test result in Table 1, it shows that leverage does 
not influence earnings management. Such fact is 
based can be proved by viewing the negative coeffi-
cient regression b value (-0.018) as well as signifi-
cance level of 0.775 larger than the significant level of 
α = 0.05. Thus, the (H2) hypothesis results which 
states that leverage positively affects earnings man-
agement is rejected.  
The lack of influence from the leverage shows 
that debt covenant agreement done by Indonesia 
Most Trusted Companies with debt holders is not 
the only factor that can motivate management to 
perform earnings management. Management will 
likely seek to avoid consequences from the violation 
of debt covenant, due to the fact that managing 
numbers related to debt transactions will most likely 
give burden to companies, such as the probability of 
the acceleration of debt maturities, the increase of 
interests as well as renegotiation of the debt time 
length (Beneish and Press 1995 in Herawati and 
Baridwan 2007). Furthermore, tight monitoring on 
the company by debt holders exists in Indonesia 
Most Trusted Companies. Debt holders by them-
selves will try to supervise the use of funds im-
planted in such companies; moreover the mandatory 
implementation of CG concept could influence the 
behavior of management in providing information 
related with debt holder. Supporting the research by 
Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008), Azlina (2010), Susi-
lowati et al. (2011) and Ardison et al. (2012) which 
states that leverage does not influence earnings 
management.  
The third hypothesis (H3) states that CG nega-
tively influences earnings management. The purpose 
of this research is to figure out the influence of CG 
towards earnings management. Based on the statisti-
cal test with SPSS (Table 1), it shows that CG nega-
tively effects earnings management. Such findings 
can be proved by looking at the negative regression 
coefficient value (-0.003) as well as the significance 
level which is 0.018 smaller than the significance 
level of α = 0.05. Thus the H3 research hypothesis 
that states that CG negatively affects earnings man-
agement can be accepted. The result of this test 
means that the better the CG concept is implemented 
in a company, then the smaller the actions of earn-
ings management will be. This means that the Indo-
nesia Most Trusted Companies those implements 
the CG concept properly is a company that has over-
sight mechanisms, which most certainly will protect 
every stockholder’s interest.  
Considering how important is public trust or 
other stockholder’s trust in supporting the survival 
of a company, the implementation of CG in a com-
Table 1 
Moderated Regression Analysis 
Variable Regression Coefficient Statistic t Significance 
Size 0.046 3.123 0.003 
Leverage -0.018 -0.288 0.775 
Corporate Governance -0.003 -2.472 0.018 
Size*CG -0.040 -2.707 0.010 
Leverage*CG 0.087 2.378 0.022 
Statistic F =0.000 
R2= 0.481 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
Residual Test Results for Moderation on Size 
Coefficientsa 
Unstd. Coefficients Std. Coefficients 
Model 
B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. 
(Constant) 5.953 . 550  10.823 .000 1 
Training  -8.824 4.234 -.297 -2.084 .043 
a. Dependent Variable: AbsRes_Size    
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pany now has become mandatory for the companies 
registered in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. This 
CG concept will give balance in managing a com-
pany that harmonizes the management and stake-
holders’ interest in achieving the company’s main 
goal, so that a good business climate will be created 
as a level of achievement towards a result of efforts 
in meeting requirements, showing priority and regu-
larity of its operations based on CG concept (FCGI 
2001). Referring to the principles developed by 
OECD by paying attention to the requirements from 
Financial Service Authority (OJK) as well as Indone-
sian Stock Exchange (BEI), guidelines are drafted 
which can be a reference in implementing CG con-
cept in Indonesian which contains the following 
aspects: (1) the protection of the rights of sharehold-
ers, (2) the equitable treatment of shareholders, (3) 
the role of stakeholders in corporate governance), (4) 
disclosure and transparency and (5) the responsibili-
ties of the board 
The results of this research shows that the im-
plementation of CG concept can lower the acts of 
earnings management, due to the fact that a good 
CG concept implementation exists will make opera-
tional activities of a company to be more controlled, 
thus it can go in accordance to the expected com-
pany’s goal. The result of this research is in line with 
the findings of Chung and Hsiang (2007), Gulzar 
and Zongjun (2011), as well Sun and Yong (2012), 
which shows that the implementation of CG nega-
tively influences earnings management.  
Table 2 and 3 explain the hypothesis 4 (H4) and 
hypothesis 5 (H5) states that the implementation of 
CG weakens the relationship between firm size and 
earnings management and the implementation of 
CG weakens the relationship between leverage and 
earnings management respectively. Based on the 
residual test, it shows that CG can moderate relation 
between firm size and leverage on DA. The results of 
residual tests by using residual tests shows that CG 
can moderate firm size as well leverage on earnings 
management. Results of the residual test for firm 
size and leverage shows that the sig. value as large 
as (0.043< 0.05) as well as a negative beta coefficient 
of (-8.824) for an absolute residual firm size value, 
while the sig. value of (0.031< 0.05) and its negative 
beta coefficient of (-9.343) for an absolute residual 
leverage value. The results of such test is parallel to 
the requirements in a residual test, where the signifi-
cant (sig.) value as well as the negative parameter 
coefficient value (beta value) (which means there is a 
lack of fit between CG and DA), means that the CG 
variable can affect the relation of size and leverage 
on earnings management. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION AND LIMITATIONS 
This research examines the influence of firm size, 
leverage, as well as corporate governance towards 
the practice of earnings management, by having a 
moderating CG variable. Based on the results and 
discussions in this research, we obtained the follow-
ing conclusions and recommendations.  
This research discovered that a positive influ-
ence between firm size and earnings management 
exists. This finding is not in line with one of the hy-
pothesis in the positive accounting theory: political 
cost hypothesis (size hypothesis) which shows that 
the larger the size of the company, the greater the 
likelihood the company will perform earnings man-
agement, by selecting accounting methods that will 
lower profit.  
The finding of leverage in this research shows 
that there is not enough prove to state that the 
higher the leverage the higher the conduct of earn-
ings management. This finding is not in line with the 
views of debt covenant hypothesis, which states that 
the higher the debt/equity, the more likely the man-
ager uses accounting procedures and method in 
increasing accounting profit.  
Corporate Governance (CG) shows negative ef-
fects on earnings management. This finding suggests 
that a negative direction exists between CG and the 
act of earnings management. This result is in line 
with the hopes of implementing CG concept on a 
company, where a company that implements CG 
principles will become better and most certainly 
opportunistic behaviors such as earnings manage-
ment can be suppressed.  
This research also proves that CG can moderate 
Table 3 
Residual Test Result for Moderation on Leverage 
Coefficientsa 
Unstd. Coefficients Std. Coefficients Model 
B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. 
(Constant) 6.153 .547  11.257 .000 1 
Training  -9.343 4.208 -.314 -2.220 .031 
a. Dependent Variable: Commitment     
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the influence of firm size as well as leverage on earn-
ings management or interaction of CG with firm size 
as well as leverage in influencing the acts of earnings 
management. This means that the result of this re-
search explains that the implementations of CG con-
cept can weaken the relationship between firm size 
and leverage by the conduct of earnings manage-
ment performed by management. The CG concept 
has a range of monitoring and control mechanisms 
that can protect all the interests of the stakeholders, 
so that it can create an alignment in achieving the 
intended corporate goals. The road towards the es-
tablishment of good corporate governance is not 
easy, it needs commitment, consistency and sincerity 
of the various parties involved in it. Companies that 
have implemented CG concept should fully ensure 
implemented CG principles on every business aspect 
and company ranks not just as a mere adhere to the 
rules of discourse and legislation in force.  
This research only used firm size, leverage and 
corporate governance variable in its examination. 
Based on the determinations test’s results (R2), as 
much as 48,1 % of the earnings management changes 
variance, it can be explained by the independent 
variable made up of firm size, leverage and CG, 
while the remaining 51,9 % is explained by other 
variables which is not included in this research 
model. The adding of other variable that are per-
ceived to be related to earnings management can be 
used, while still including firm size and leverage 
variable to find out the difference of the results ob-
tained.  
This research only uses company that attained 
the predicate of Indonesia Most Trusted Companies 
and uses limited sample and population; as a result 
the results of this research cannot be broadly gener-
alized to every public company in Indonesia. So for 
future research, it is recommendable to use samples 
that are more accurate by using all companies listed 
in the Indonesian Stock Exchange, manufacturing 
and other industries as well as the adding of annual 
observation samples.  
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